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What I remember most about the demonstrations against the World Trade Org a n i z a t i o n
in Seattle in the winter of 1999 was the exhilaration of knowing by sundown of the first
day that veterans of the 1960s like myself would not be condemned to live out the rest
of our days never again to be part of a living movement for radical social change in our
own country. But since I did not read a newspaper or watch a television for four days
while in Seattle, I had no idea how the rest of the country was viewing “The Battle for
Seattle.” I had only the mouse’s eye view until I returned home to Washington DC and
opened five days of newspapers sitting outside my apartment. To my surprise I
discovered that the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the Boston Globe h a d
finally conceded that someone other than a crackpot or spokesperson for a “special
interest” might have legitimate grounds for questioning the merits of neoliberal
globalization. What was only a moderate sized demonstration by my standards had, to
my surprise, succeeded in moving the issue of globalization from a back to a front
burner in the United States. 
Reporters were suddenly allowed to seek out “two views” whenever covering a
globalization story. Editorial writers and syndicated columnists could no longer simply
presume that the benefits of neoliberal policies were beyond question. At press
conferences US government officials, and officials at the World Trade Org a n i z a t i o n
( W TO), World Bank (WB), and International Monetary Fund (IMF) were finally asked
by reporters to respond to criticisms of their policies and programs. This is not to say
both views have received equal treatment in the mainstream US media since Seattle, nor
that the views of those opposing corporate sponsored globalization have been accurately
represented. Far from it. But US opponents of neoliberal globalization had crossed a
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significant political watershed. Fifty thousand demonstrators, ten thousand of whom
were willing to engage in civil disobedience, had won their fellow US citizens the
opportunity to debate what the rest of the world had been debating for years: Wa s
neoliberal globalization good or bad for the earth and most of its inhabitants?
Unfortunately we have won little else in the ensuing six years. While everyone now
knows there are two sides to the story, and while opponents of neoliberal globalization
have strengthened our intellectual case and convinced many who listen of the validity of
our arguments, we have had no appreciable impact on actual policies or on the pace and
destructiveness of neoliberal globalization. At most there have been changes in the
rhetoric of some neoliberal global managers, and changes in the names but not the
substance of some programs. In other words, neoliberal global managers have responded
to criticism and increasing popular skepticism about globalization not with policy
changes but with a slicker public relations campaign. While there are many other things
the movement for global justice must do to become more effective, we should always
seek to sharpen our intellectual “case” against neoliberal globalization. That is what I
will try to do in my talk here today. 
The Neoliberal Story Line
Before criticizing the neoliberal theory of globalization, it is important to appreciate
why it is so alluring. It is intellectually attractive because it can be expressed in a simple,
elegant way. Of course its real power derives not from its logical or intellectual content,
but from the fact that according to neoliberal theory multinational corporations and
wealthy investors should not only be permitted, but encouraged to do exactly what they
want to do. But since this is a talk about the intellectual merits of a theory, rather than
the political power of those who endorse it, I begin by singing a song worthy of the
ancient sirens.
Capital Liberalization
It is inefficient to prevent capital from moving to wherever it is most productive. So if
lending to a less developed country (LDC) increases productivity there more than it
would in a more developed country (MDC), restrictions on international lending
activities necessarily entail efficiency losses. Similarly, if building a plant in an LDC
raises the productivity of LDC workers by more than building the plant in an MDC
would increase the productivity of MDC workers, then restrictions on foreign direct
investment necessarily impose efficiency losses. Therefore, neoliberals conclude,
removing restrictions on international financial investment (IFI) and foreign direct
investment (FDI) increases global economic eff i c i e n c y, benefiting borrowers and
lenders, investors and host countries alike.
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Trade Liberalization
If the US is better at making tools and Mexico is better at making shirts, it is easy to see
why there will be an efficiency gain if the US produces all the tools and Mexico
produces all the shirts, and each country exports the good it is better at producing and
imports the good the other country makes better. But even if the US is better than
Mexico at making b o t h tools and shirts, not only Mexico but the US as well can be better
o ff if the two countries specialize and trade. Of course it was David Ricardo who
discovered this powerful “truth” and explained why it only seems counter intuitive at
first. Ever since Ricardo economists have understood that trade is driven by comparative
advantage (CA) not absolute advantage. Therefore, if the US is 4 times as good at
making tools, but only 2 times as good at making shirts, it is still more efficient to have
the US make only tools (which it is 4 times better at), instead of making shirts (which it
is only 2 times better at), while Mexico produces only shirts (which it is only 2 times
worse at), instead of making tools (which Mexico is 4 times worse at.) In other words,
it does not matter if countries have different overall levels of development, or
p r o d u c t i v i t y, they have good reason to specialize and trade with one another in any case.
As long as the differences in productivity between countries are u n e v e n, i.e. greater in
one industry than in another, the possibility of mutually beneficial specialization and
trade exists. Therefore, neoliberals conclude, removing barriers to the free trade of
goods and services among countries will increase global eff i c i e n c y, and as long as
countries are free to walk away from any deals that do not leave them better off, the
e fficiency gain will be distributed so as to make every country absolutely better off than
it would have been without trade.
Fiscal and Monetary Discipline
When global capital markets impose fiscal and monetary discipline on national
governments they protect citizens from irresponsible politicians seeking short-run
political advantages. Similarly, when the IMF insists on fiscal and monetary discipline
in exchange for bail out loans they act in the interests of the citizens who have been
betrayed by their elected representatives who run budget deficits and lax monetary
policies to the detriment of the long run health of their economies. Therefore, neoliberals
conclude, when international credit markets and the IMF make it possible for global
investors to veto fiscal and monetary policies chosen by elected governments, they act
in the long term interests of the citizens those governments misrepresent. 
Globalization and the Environment
F i n a l l y, since these neoliberal policies are the best policies to promote economic growth,
and since the Kuznets curve tells us that rising GDP per capita is what increases people’s
demand for environmental amenities, neoliberals conclude that capital liberalization,
trade liberalization, and macroeconomic policy discipline are the best policies to protect
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the environment in the long run. The fortuitous discovery that neoliberalism is the
e n v i r o n m e n t ’s best friend provides a soothing last verse to the alluring song mainstream
economists sing about neoliberal globalization.
Neoliberal Caveats
There are important caveats which the more cautious and intellectually rigorous 
supporters of neoliberalism do hum in the background. Even though the caveats
explaining why there may be losers as well as winners within countries are invariably
drowned out by the sirens’ paean to the virtues of neoliberal globalization, we should
lend an ear to the caveats nonetheless. 
There Are Losers from Trade in the Short Run
Honest neoliberals admit that within countries there will be losers as well as winners
from trade liberalization in the short run. Since trade liberalization will decrease
production in some industries while it increases production in others, those who own or
work in firms in importing industries will suffer in the short run. Therefore, steel
companies and steel workers were not foolish to oppose trade liberalization in the
United States. Since the US no longer enjoyed a comparative advantage in steel
production, they were correct to anticipate that production, employment, profits, and
wages in the steel industry would fall when trade barriers were lowered. On the other
hand, financial service companies and their employees were wise to support trade
liberalization in the US. Since the US has a comparative advantage in financial services,
they were right to anticipate that when trade barriers were lowered production,
employment, profits, and wages in the financial services sector would rise. In other
words, mainstream economists acknowledge the common wisdom that those associated
with importing industries lose while those associated with exporting industries win from
trade liberalization. But they hasten to point out: (1) The theory of comparative
advantage guarantees that the winnings out weigh the losings. (2) In theory the losers
could be fully compensated still leaving the winners better off. And (3) these are only
short run effects. 
There Are Losers from Trade in the Long Run
Honest neoliberals also admit that within countries there will be losers as well as
winners from trade liberalization in the long run. However, they begin by pointing out
that even in absence of compensation for losers, those who own capital and those who
work in importing industries are not necessarily damaged by trade liberalization in the
long run. While it is always inconvenient to have to disinvest and reinvest one’s capital,
or to change jobs, in the long run export industries will expand and hire unemployed
factors of production from importing industries in decline. However, this does not mean
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there will not be predictable losers as well as winners in the long run. Of course this is
the domain of Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) theory that teaches us who the winners and losers
within countries are likely to be from trade liberalization. According to HO theory
owners of factors of production that are more abundant in a country than they are in
other countries will be the winners from trade liberalization in the long run, while
owners of factors that are more scarce in a country than they are in other countries will
be the losers in the long run. This is because according to HO theory a country will tend
to have comparative advantages in the production of products that use factors of
production that are relatively abundant in that country. Since trade liberalization will
increase the production of the goods in which a country has a comparative advantage, it
will also increase demand for relatively abundant factors of production, and therefore
increase payments to relatively abundant factors. The opposite holds for relatively
scarce factors. Trade liberalization decreases production of goods in which a country
does not enjoy a comparative advantage, which tend to be goods that use factors of
production that are relatively scarce in that country. This decreases demand for relatively
scarce factors, and therefore decreases payments to relatively scarce factors. 
When we look to see what factors of production are relatively abundant and relatively
scarce in the United States, we find that capital is r e l a t i v e l y abundant while labour is
r e l a t i v e l y scarce. So in the long run HO theory predicts that trade liberalization will put
upward pressure on profits and downward pressure on wages in the US. We also find
that college educated labour is r e l a t i v e l y abundant in the US while less educated labour
is r e l a t i v e l y scarce. So in the long run HO theory predicts that trade liberalization will
put upward pressure on the wages of more educated workers and downward pressure on
the wages of less educated US workers. In sum, we find that mainstream trade theory
validates the view that in the United States workers, and particularly less educated
workers, are the long run losers from freer trade, while capitalists and highly educated
workers are the long run winners.
There Are Losers from Capital Liberalization
Honest neoliberals also admit that within countries those who enjoy the benefits of
capital liberalization are often not the same as those who bear the costs. For example,
Suharto and his cronies benefited greatly from running up Indonesia’s international debt
in the 1980s and early 1990s, but most of the burden was born by people who lost jobs
and income when the East Asian financial crisis hit in 1997 and when the IMF insisted
on fiscal and monetary austerity in 1998. Those responsible for running up debt in most
LDCs are usually not the ones who bear the burden of repayment.
In general, the more thoughtful who recommend trade and capital liberalization include
the following caveat: While all countries benefit as a whole from trade and capital
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liberalization, the distribution of costs and benefits w i t h i n countries may be problematic.
One might hope that governments and international financial institutions (IFIs) would
focus on the obvious implication of this admission — that redistributive policies are
required to correct for inequities caused by neoliberal globalization. But unfortunately
champions of neoliberalism have more often drawn a different conclusion — that since
there will be losers as well as winners within countries, and since those who are hurt will
try to obstruct progress even though globalization is in the general interest, it is of
paramount importance not to listen to complaints from the victims of globalization.
Environmental Damage May Increase in the Short Run
Honest neoliberals also admit that as LDCs develop their environments are likely to suffer
in the short-run. The famous Kuznets curve is, after all, a “U.” In other words, as GDP
per capita grows initially in LDCs the environment may come under greater stress, just as
it did in the MDCs during their early development. (The downward part of the “U.”) 
But as per capita GDP starts to rise from the bottom of the Kuznets curve, consumer
demand for environmental “amenities” will increase in LDCs, just as it did in MDCs
in the late twentieth century. So while there may be increasing pressure on the 
environment temporarily, in the long run supporters argue that neoliberal policies are the
environment’s best friend because they move LDCs into the upward part of the Kuznets
curve more quickly.
In conclusion, the important lessons for supporters is that even after careful
consideration of all the caveats: (1) Neoliberal policies should be unfettered so as to
maximize the growth of global GDP. (2) Those who oppose globalization represent
special interests within countries who are harmed by neoliberal globalization. But since
costs to losers are smaller than gains to winners, these special interests should not be
heeded. And (3) any corrective measures deemed necessary should be engaged in after
the fact, and never obstruct or delay liberalization. Unfortunately, as alluring as the
neoliberal story may be, it is fundamentally untrue. Both the simple version and the
version with caveats paper over important issues and dynamics that dramatically change
the conclusions.
What Neoliberals Don’t Want You To Know
The missing story falls into two broad categories. Initially critics focused on the unjust
redistribution of income, wealth, and power that neoliberal globalization aggravates. 
As a result, the part of the critique of neoliberalism that is best known is that neoliberal
policies generate more inequities than advocates let on, the inequities are far greater than
proponents admit, and there is every reason to believe the inequities will go uncorrected
and grow over time. Not only are there winners and losers within countries, there are
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winners and losers a m o n g countries. A crucial part of the missing story that mainstream
theory hides is that even when there are global efficiency gains from capital or trade
liberalization, these gains will be distributed between countries in ways that aggravate
global inequalities. Moreover, even if a country benefits as a whole, so the gains to
winners outweigh the losses to losers within the country, a majority of the population are
losers and only a minority are winners. In other words, early critics of neoliberal
globalization argued that the devil is in the caveats, and what neoliberals call caveats
are, in truth, the main story line.
The part of the missing story that is less well known is that while neoliberal policies may
increase global efficiency in some regards, there is good reason to believe they increase
economic inefficiency in even more important ways. In other words, critics have begun
to challenge what neoliberals consider their main story line, and argue it is simply
wrong. I will begin with this second line of criticism, briefly summarizing empirical
evidence others have gathered suggesting that neoliberalism has, in fact, retarded global
growth, followed by a careful review of all the theoretical reasons why we should 
not find this surprising. I begin with the criticism that neoliberal policies retard 
growth because it is least well known, because it is the major virtue its proponents claim,
and because if neoliberalism does not generate positive net efficiency gains there 
is no reason to consider tolerating policies that even its proponents concede aggravate
global inequality.
Even before the Battle for Seattle a few of us had started to look at empirical evidence
linking neoliberal international reforms and global growth. To our surprise we
discovered that global growth rates were almost twice as high during the Bretton Wo o d s
era before neoliberal policies gained sway, than they were after the ascendancy of
neoliberalism. In other words, preliminary evidence did not support neoliberal claims
that their policies increased global growth rates, it suggested just the opposite. It was as
if advocates of neoliberal reforms had been given a “pass” by the mainstream of the
economics profession, the mainstream media, and by leaders of conservative and liberal
political parties alike, before anyone had bothered to grade their exam!
Most mainstream economists assume neoliberal globalization has produced significant
e fficiency gains, and begrudgingly admit it has increased global inequality. Evidence of
escalating inequality is so overwhelming that nobody dares deny it, and for all who wish
to see, it stands out as the most salient characteristic of the global economy during the
past quarter century. But it turns out on more careful examination there is no compelling
evidence suggesting efficiency gains from neoliberal policies. As a matter of fact, there
is strong empirical evidence that neoliberal policies have slowed global growth rates
s i g n i f i c a n t l y. A report prepared by Angus Maddison for the Organization for Economic
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Cooperation and Development (OECD) titled Monitoring the World Economy 1820-
1 9 9 2 published in 1995 provided an early warning that the popular impression that
neoliberal policies had increased the rate of world economic growth was simply wrong.
Maddison compared growth rates in the seven major regions of the world from 1950 to
1973 — the Bretton Woods era — to growth rates from 1974 to 1992 — the neoliberal
era — and found there had been significant d e c l i n e s in the annual average rate of growth
of GDP per capita in six of the seven regions, and only a slight increase in one region,
Asia. Maddison reported that the average annual rate of growth of world GDP per capita
during the neoliberal period was slightly more than half what it had been in the Bretton
Woods era. The Economic Policy Research Center updated Maddison’s work in
Scorecard on Globalization 1980-2000: Twenty Years of Diminished Progress, and
reconfirmed his conclusion that neoliberal policies had continued to be accompanied by
a significant d e c r e a s e in the rate of growth of world GDP per capita through the end of
the century.
Since the IMF elevated capital liberalization to the status of an economic
commandment, it is particularly surprising that numerous empirical studies by IMF
economists could find no statistically significant positive relationship between capital
liberalization and economic growth rates. Stanley Fischer, who as Assistant Managing
Director was often the IMF official who delivered the commandment to LDCs during
the 1990s, gave the luncheon address to the American University Conference on
Globalization held in the spring of 2000. When asked by my colleague, Professor Robert
B l e c k e r, to comment on these studies, Fischer refused to discuss the IMF staff papers
even though they were available to the public, but insisted he was confident economic
historians would verify the positive contribution of capital liberalization to economic
growth thirty years hence. In other words, Stanley Fischer knew in 2000 there was no
empirical evidence to support the relentless IMF campaign for capital liberalization, and
that it was essentially a faith-based initiative.
To put it simply, as any economist knows isolating the effect of particular policies on
economic growth in a world where many other factors affect growth, and those other
factors change all the time, is a tricky business at best. But if dismantling the Bretton
Woods system while promoting capital and trade liberalization had really produced more
e fficiency gains than losses, it is hard to imagine how world growth rates would have
been cut almost in half! When it was clear that data strongly suggested that neoliberal
policies had retarded growth rather than enhanced it, opponents began to search for
theoretical reasons why this was so in addition to reasons why neoliberal policies were
aggravating global inequality.
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How Capital Liberalization Retards Growth
Why IFI and DFI almost always increase global inequality even when they do create an
e fficiency gain is explained below. But the simplistic neoliberal view that capital
liberalization necessarily increases global efficiency and thereby increases world growth
rates is biased and terribly misleading.
Profitability Is Not the Same as Productivity
First of all, just because DFI is more profitable than investing in new plant and
machinery at home does not mean the plant and machinery are more productive than
they would have been at home. DFI might be more profitable because the barg a i n i n g
power of third world workers is even less than that of their first world counterparts. Or
DFI might be more profitable because third world governments are more desperate to
woo foreign investors and offer larger tax breaks and lower environmental standards to
businesses locating there. Neither of these reasons profits from DFI might be higher than
profits from domestic operations imply that the plant, machinery or know-how raises
productivity more abroad than it would have at home. When international investment is
driven by corporations’ search for lower wages, lower taxes, and more lax regulations
regarding worker health and safety and the environment, there is no reason to assume
that the investment is actually more productive abroad than it would have been at home,
and may, in fact, be less so. 
Not All Loans Increase Productivity
It is also not necessarily the case that just because foreign borrowers are willing to pay
higher rates of interest, loans are more useful or productive abroad than at home. W h e n
Z a i r e ’s dictator, Mobutu, borrowed hundreds of millions at exorbitant interest rates he
used the loans to line the pockets of his family and political allies and to buy weapons
to intimidate his subjects. There was no increase in economic productivity in Zaire
associated with the loans, and consequently no increased product with which to pay back
international creditors after Mobutu departed.
Financial Sectors Are Not Crisis Proof
A more serious problem with international lending is that when production in
developing economies is tied more tightly to the international credit system and the
credit system breaks down, real economies and their inhabitants suffer huge losses of
production, employment, and capital accumulation. Whenever any credit system is
extended there is a potential downside for the real economy, as well as a potential
upside. When there are no financial crises there may be efficiency gains from
liberalizing the international credit system — as mainstream finance theory goes to great
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lengths to teach. But when there are financial crises there can also be big eff i c i e n c y
losses in affected “real” economies. Mainstream financial economists seldom point out
the potential efficiency losses inherent in extending the credit system. They do not
emphasize the losses in production that can occur if there is some sort of financial crisis.
They do not point out that the possibility of financial crisis is inherent in a n y c r e d i t
system. Nor do they explain that the root source of financial crises is n o t i r r a t i o n a l
human behavior, but very astute r a t i o n a l b e h a v i o r.
One of my favorite applications of game theory is a simple model called “The Bank Run
Model” in Robert Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economists (Princeton University
Press, 1992.) The model nicely illustrates that there are t w o equilibria, not one, to the
banking “game.” When other depositors do not withdraw, each individual depositor’s
best strategy is also not to withdraw. When this occurs all goes well for depositors, the
bank, and those the bank lends to. But when other depositors do withdraw, the
individually rational strategy is to withdraw as quickly as possible. This is not irrational
behavior at all. On the contrary, hesitation and failure to withdraw quickly is
individually disastrous. Unfortunately when depositors behave in this way we have a
second equilibrium outcome to the banking game, just as much the product of
individually rational behavior as the first. The difference is that depositors, the bank, and
those the bank lent to all lose.
One of my favorite models in my own book, The ABCs of Political Economy ( P l u t o
Press, 2002) is called “Banks in a Simple Corn Model.” This model adds a bank to a
very simple model of the “real economy.” By combining a financial sector with a real
economy in their simplest forms it is possible to see exactly how the financial sector c a n
increase efficiency when it permits borrowers to engage in more productive activity
sooner than they would have otherwise been able to if they had had to wait until their
own savings were sufficient to finance their productive investment. But it also illustrates
how a financial sector c a n cause efficiency losses in the real economy when there is a
financial crisis and borrowers can no longer find lenders and must sink back into less
productive activities. 
If one substitutes “emerging market economy” for “bank” and “international investor”
for “depositor” in these models, the models also illustrate the dangers inherent in the
liberalized international financial system. I titled my book about neoliberal globalization
Panic Rules! to highlight this problem. There are two rules of behavior in any credit
system: Rule #1 is the rule all participants want all o t h e r participants to follow: DON’T
PANIC! Rule #2 is the rule each participant must be careful to follow herself: PA N I C
FIRST! In the early 1990s the IMF and World Bank, at the behest of the US Department
of the Tr e a s u r y, worked hard to create a disaster waiting to happen where it became
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increasingly rational for international investors to follow rule #2, panic first, with
disastrous consequences for all.
Creating An Accident Waiting To Happen
In the early 1990s delegations from the IMF used carrots to ply amenable governments
and sticks to beat reluctant governments to eliminate restrictions not only on DFI, but
on the inflow and outflow of speculative, short-run liquid capital as well. Below are
some of the commitments extracted by the IMF from South Korea in exchange for an
IMF loan in the spring of 1998. They are taken from a “Letter of Intent” dated May 2,
1998, addressed to Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the IMF, and signed by
Chol-Hwan Chon, Governor of the Korean Central Bank, and Kyu-Sung Lee, Korean
Minster of Finance:
• Appoint outside experts to assist the Privatization Committee to develop a
privatization strategy for Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank, and obtain bids for
KFB and SB by November 15, 1998.
• Submit legislation to abolish regulations that prohibit foreigners from becoming
bank managers by June 30, 1998.
• Conduct a comprehensive review of all remaining restrictions on corporate
foreign borrowing, including restrictions on borrowing of 1-3 year maturities, as
part of a review of the Foreign Exchange Management Law to be completed by
December 31, 1998.
• Submit legislation to abolish restrictions on foreign ownership of land and real
estate properties by June 30, 1998.
• Increase the permitted equity ownership by foreigners of Korean telephone
service providers from 33 to 49 percent by January 1, 1999.
• Permit equity investment in nonlisted companies and eliminate the aggregate
ceiling on foreign investment in Korean equities by December 31, 1998.
• Submit legislation to fully liberalize rules on takeovers of nonstrategic Korean
corporations by foreign investors by eliminating the ceiling on the amount of
stock foreigners can acquire without approval by a company’s Board of Directors
by June 30, 1998.
What Mainstream Economists Won’t Tell You About Neoliberal Globalization16
• Permit foreigners to engage in securities dealings, insurance, leasing, and other
property related businesses by April 1, 1998.
That the IMF would demand concessions like these is astonishing for many reasons, not
the least of which is that the question of foreign ownership had nothing to do with the
Korean economic crisis or its resolution. Yet the IMF took full advantage of the Korean
crisis to extract concessions not only removing restrictions on foreign investment and
ownership, but removing restrictions on the magnitude of short term international
borrowing in hard currencies by Korean corporations and banks - despite the fact that
excessive borrowing of this kind was the immediate cause of the financial crisis in the
first place!
As a result of IMF policies like these applied in one developing country after another, 
a mushrooming pool of liquid global wealth was suddenly free to move wherever and
whenever it wished at the click of a mouse on a computer screen in New York, London,
or Tokyo. In 1986 $0.2 trillion per day traded on foreign exchange markets. By 1998 that
figure was $1.5 trillion, only 2% of which was needed to finance international trade and
productive investment, which means that 98% of the $1.5 trillion traded per day in
currency markets by 1998 was for purely speculative reasons. Moreover, financial
liberalization and deregulation in the advanced economies meant that much of this liquid
global wealth, managed by 30 year old recent MBAs knowing little about the “emerg i n g
market” economies they were investing in, was highly leveraged and therefore even
more prone to panic and contagion.
The neoliberal global managers created the financial equivalent of the proverbial 900
pound gorilla: Where does the 900 pound gorilla - liquid global wealth - sit? W h e r e v e r
it wants! And when a derivative tickles, and investors obey Panic Rule #2 – panic first!
– currencies, stock markets, banking systems, and, most importantly for the rest of us,
formerly productive economies all collapse in their wake. In 1997 the disaster struck in
Thailand and spread to Malaysia, Indonesia, and South Korea. Soon after a separate
d i s a s t e r, created by no-holds-barred, neoliberal policies in Russia, spread from Russia to
Brazil. Since then Ecuador, Tu r k e y, and most notably A rgentina, the IMF poster child of
the 1990s which has now suffered the worst economic collapse in the history of Latin
America, have all experienced serious financial crises. Similar or worse disasters can
still strike anywhere because thanks to the neoliberal global managers there is plenty of
financial tinder to catch fire, and most financial fire breaks have been removed. 
Neoliberal capital liberalization in the past 20 years has been the most reckless and
irresponsible extension of any credit system in world financial history. Nineteenth
What Mainstream Economists Won’t Tell You About Neoliberal Globalization 17
century financial crises that twentieth century economic historians used to write about
as relics of dangerous, bygone days don’t hold a candle to the financial crises of the past
decade. The magnitude of liquid global wealth is unprecedented. New financial
“products” wielded by highly leveraged global hedge funds abound. Prudent regulations
and monitoring have been eliminated. All manner of capital controls governments once
used to intervene in timely ways to ward off currency crises have been rooted out. T h e r e
is no credible international lender of last resort. And serious regional rivalries have
prevented timely emergency measures except when US companies are most at risk. T h e
d i fference in how the Mexico peso crisis was handled in the mid 1990s and the East
Asian financial crisis was handled in the late 1990s has not been lost on Asian countries.
At the behest of Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan and Secretary of the
Treasury Robert Rubin the IMF orchestrated the Mexican bail out quickly, with few
questions asked, and even fewer conditionalities imposed. When Japan offered 100
billion to do the same when the East Asian crisis first hit, Larry Summers, then A s s i s t a n t
Secretary of the Treasury for International A ffairs, was dispatched to read the Japanese
the riot act, order them to butt out, and threaten that the IMF would wash its hands of
the East Asian crisis if Japan dared provide emergency loans to afflicted governments
without severe conditionalities. The result of this double standard was that the East
Asian crisis — an economic tsunami that Princeton University economics professor and
New York Times columnist Paul Krugman described as “the worst falling from economic
grace since the Great Depression” — was far worse than it need have been.
If mainstream academic financial economists bothered to step back and look seriously
at the world credit system as it presently functions, they would realize that it is their
worst nightmare come true. As a matter of fact, a few economic luminaries have come
to this realization. When evidence of the disastrous effects of capital liberalization
became overwhelming, Joseph Stiglitz, Jeffery Sachs, and Paul Krugman —
indisputably among the “best and the brightest” mainstream economists of the 1980s
and early 1990s — all broke with neoliberal orthodoxy and denounced these dangerous
policies in no uncertain terms. But you don’t have to listen to me, or to any of these
former mainstream stars who have been pushed to the left by the arrogant and
destructive reign of the neoliberal establishment. You can listen to Paul Vo l c k e r, whose
conservative credentials in the financial community are unimpeachable. Paul Volcker is
best known as the conservative, inflation fighting Chairman of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System from 1979 through 1987. Prior to that he served
Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon in a variety of capacities. After retiring from
the Fed he became Chairman of James D. Wolfenson & Co. Inc. and the Henry Kaufman
Visiting Professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business. Paul Volcker had
this to say in his luncheon address to the Overseas Development Council Conference on
“Making Globalization Work” on March 18, 1999:
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Everybody talks about globalism these days to the point we are all sick of the
term. But what has been too little emphasized is that the process has lots of
problems. Here we are, about a decade after the downfall of the old Soviet
Union, trumpeting the striking ideological triumph of democratic capitalism and
open markets. But looking around the world right now, things are not so benign.
My position is that the dramatic succession of international financial crises is a
reflection of deep-seated systemic problems. I do not think the pervasiveness of
these crises can be traced primarily to particular human or institutional failings
in the emerging world. Of course, there is no doubt such failings exist. But
beyond those particulars, there are destabilizing forces at work, forces inherent
in the organization (or lack of organization) of the international financial
system in a world of free capital and money markets.
Since the neoliberal view is that crony capitalism, corruption, flawed accounting
practices, unsound banking systems, lack of transparency, and irresponsible economic
policies by governments in the affected countries are the causes of their crises, it is
surprising and refreshing to hear a conservative, emeritus professor of financial
regulation admit that the official explanation is total hogwash. Volker continues:
Ponder a bit what went wrong in the emerging market countries. How is it, with
their weak banking systems, the lack of transparency and their lack of
accounting standards the emerging countries of Southeast Asia, for decades,
managed really extraordinary rates of growth 6, 7 or even 8 percent a year?
Only in the late 1990’s have they collapsed in one big pile together. What is
different now than before?
First of all, international markets are much larger and more fluid than ever
before. More of the participants have a short-term, transaction orientation, and
the new technology means they can act quickly to move large amounts of funds.
What has been less recognized and commented upon is how small the financial
markets are in most of the emerging economies, particularly small relative to the
exponential growth of the international financial markets. Those small and weak
financial markets are a reflection of the small and undiversified nature of most
of their economies. My favorite example has been Argentina where I happened
to visit at the time of the Mexican crisis and its so-called Tequila effect. I’m
supposed to have some familiarity with these things, but I was nonetheless
startled to learn that the aggregate amount of deposits in the Argentine banking
system in 1994 was some $45 billion. At that time, that was about equivalent to
the size of the second largest bank in Pittsburgh Pennsylvania. The speed with
which those small open economies have opened their financial markets is really
amazing. It mainly is a phenomenon of the 1990’s. What gives pause is the fact
that here, less than a decade later, they are in mass distress.
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This is Paul Vo l c k e r, ex Fed Chairman, not Paul Sweezy, the late Marxist editor of
Monthly Review Magazine, dismissing the standard explanations for the economic crisis
which blame the victims, and arguing instead that the crisis was caused by nothing more
than the predictable effects of unleashing unbridled international finance on vulnerable
less developed economies — whether their governments wanted it or not. Vo l k e r
c o n c l u d e s :
You, I am sure, are familiar with the general pattern: their economic success
and enormous potential led to large capital inflows. The capital inflows in turn
put a rosy glow on their economic cheeks; interest rates stayed relatively low;
their currencies were strong; investment was stimulated and sooner or later a
real estate boom and excess capacity developed. Then something unexpected
comes along, a presidential candidate gets assassinated as in Mexico; a
currency is deemed overvalued, as in Thailand; capital gets frightened because
of a neighbor’s difficulty, as in Indonesia. Then money flows out faster than it
came in. The exchange rate goes through the floor, interest rates skyrocket, and
a financial crisis becomes an economic debacle.
How delightfully simple the true explanation for the cause of the East Asian financial
crisis turns out to be! Unfortunately, Volker might just as well have been describing the
A rgentine crisis that hit with a vengeance two years after this speech.
How Trade Liberalization Can Retard Growth
It is pointless to deny that if opportunity costs of producing goods are different in
d i fferent countries there are potential efficiency gains from specialization and trade. T h e
theory of comparative advantage is logically sound when it teaches that global
e fficiency is increased when countries specialize in making the goods they are relatively
better at producing, and import the goods some other country is relatively better at
producing. But this does not mean specialization and trade always improve global
e ff i c i e n c y. For a number of reasons it often does just the opposite.
Inaccurate Prices Can Misidentify Comparative Advantages
If commercial prices do not accurately reflect the true social opportunity costs of traded
goods, free trade can produce a counterproductive pattern of specialization, yielding
global efficiency losses not gains. If commercial prices inside a country fail to take
account of significant external effects they may misidentify where the country’s true
comparative advantage lies. And if international specialization and trade are based on
f a l s e comparative advantages it can lead to international divisions of labour that are less
productive than the less specialized patterns of global production they replace.
For example, we know the social costs of modern agricultural production in the US are
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greater than the private costs because environmentally destructive effects such as soil
erosion, pesticide run-off, and depletion of ground water aquifers go uncounted or are
undervalued. This translates into commercial prices for corn that u n d e r e s t i m a t e the true
social cost of producing corn in the US. On the other hand, when corn is grown in
Mexico farmers live in traditional Mexican villages that are relatively disease and crime
free and centuries old social safety nets exist when family members fall on hard times.
Whereas producing shoes, for example, in Mexico requires a Mexican to live in an urban
slum or maquiladora zone where disease and crime are higher and safety nets are absent.
The positive external effects of rural village life when corn is produced in Mexico are
u n d e r c o u n t e d in the commercial price of Mexican corn. If the external effects are larg e
enough, relative commercial prices in the two countries can m i s i d e n t i f y which country
truly has a comparative advantage in corn and which country truly has a comparative
advantage in shoes. While the ratio of the commercial price of corn to the commercial
price of shoes make it a p p e a r that the US is relatively more productive in corn
production and Mexico relatively more productive in shoe production, it may be that the
comparative advantage of the US is r e a l l y in shoe production and Mexico’s comparative
advantage is a c t u a l l y in corn production. The problem is that even if external effects are
significant enough so that taking them into account means it is more efficient to continue
producing corn in Mexico and shoes in the US, free trade will lead to counterproductive
specialization in which the US expands environmentally damaging corn production,
importing more shoes from Mexico, while Mexico moves its population from traditional
rural villages to urban slums and maquiladoras to increase shoe production, importing
more corn from the US. Efficiency losses like this can happen when treaties like NAFTA
increase trade based on differences in relative commercial prices rather than on true,
relative social costs — which can be substantially diff e r e n t .
Unstable International Markets Cause Macro Inefficiencies
Even if international prices for traditional exports from underdeveloped economies 
did not decline over the long run compared to the prices they pay for imports, if prices
for LDC exports are highly volatile this can damage their economies leading to global
e fficiency losses.
In the first half of the twentieth century there were years when the international price of
sugar was ten times higher than in other years. In years when Cuba exported sugar at 20
to 30 cents per pound the Cuban economy ran on all cylinders, but in years when sugar
prices fell to 2 to 3 cents per pound the Cuban economy crashed. The international price
of tin experienced similar fluctuations during the same time period, periodically
wreaking havoc with the Bolivian economy. One problem is that once the export sector
reaches full capacity levels of output there is no way to take further advantage of price
spikes. But unfortunately, when the bottom falls out of a traditional export market there 
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is no lower limit on how many people can be thrown out of work and how many
businesses can go bankrupt. So even if large drops in export prices in bad years were
canceled entirely by equally large increases in good years, LDC economies cannot
benefit from price spikes as much as they get hurt when prices crash in their traditional
export markets. Another problem is that economic development requires a degree of
s t a b i l i t y. If every decade a crash in the price of sugar or tin means local businesses
selling to the growing domestic market go bankrupt as well, it is difficult to develop new
sectors of the economy. In short, greater reliance on trade can lead to efficiency losses
when international prices prove very unstable.
Adjustment Costs Can Be Significant
The adjustment costs of moving people and resources out of one industry and into
another can be considerable. If adjustment costs are large they can cancel a significant
portion of the efficiency gain from a new pattern of international specialization —
irrespective of who pays for them. If people must be retrained, if equipment is scrapped
before it wears out, if new industries are located in different regions from old ones so
people must move to new locations requiring new schools, parks, water and sewage
systems, leaving perfectly useable social infrastructure idle in “rust belt” regions they
vacate, all this duplication and waste should be subtracted from any efficiency gains
from further specialization and trade. Since most of the adjustment costs are not paid for
by the businesses who make the decisions, the market fails to sufficiently account for
adjustment costs. Consequently, when productivity gains from some new international
division of labour are meager and adjustment costs large, we can easily get eff i c i e n c y
losses, not gains from trade.
Static Efficiency Can Prevent Dynamic Efficiency
F i n a l l y, the theory of comparative advantage is usually interpreted as implying that a
country should specialize even more in its traditional export products, since those would
presumably be the industries in which the country enjoys a comparative advantage. But
underdeveloped economies are less developed precisely because they have lower levels
of productivity than other economies enjoy. If less developed economies further
specialize in the sectors they have always specialized in, it may well be l e s s likely they
will find ways to increase their productivity. In other words, increasing s t a t i c e ff i c i e n c y
by specializing even more in today’s comparative advantages may prevent changes that
would increase productivity a great deal more, and therefore be at the expense of
d y n a m i c e ff i c i e n c y.
The hallmark of the Japanese and South Korean economic miracles, and the
considerable successes of the other Asian “tigers” who followed their lead, was that they
did n o t accept their comparative advantages at any point in time as a fait accompli.
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Instead they aggressively pursued plans to c r e a t e new comparative advantages in
industries where it would be easier to achieve larger productivity increases. Japan
moved from exporting textiles, toys, and bicycles after Word War II, to exporting steel
and automobiles in the 1960s and early 1970s, to exporting electronic equipment and
computer products by the late 1970s and early 1980s. This was accomplished through an
elaborate system of differential tax rates and terms of credit for businesses in diff e r e n t
industries at different times, planned by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) and coordinated with the Bank of Japan and the taxing authorities. The whole
point of the exercise was to create new comparative advantages in high productivity
industries rather than continue to specialize in industries where productivity growth was
s l o w. Neither Japan, South Korea, nor any of the successful Asian tigers allowed relative
commercial prices in the free market to pick their comparative advantages and
determine their pattern of industrialization and trade for them. Had they done so it is
unlikely they would have enjoyed their economic miracles. 
How IMF Conditionality Agreements Retard Growth
In exchange for a bail out loan that merely allows the country to pay off international
loans coming due that it would otherwise have to default on, IMF “conditionality
agreements” invariably demand fiscal and monetary austerity. Reducing government
spending and increasing taxes both decrease aggregate demand, and therefore decrease
employment and production. Reducing the money supply raises interest rates, which
reduces domestic investment and further decreases aggregate demand, employment, and
production. This is why IMF “structural adjustment” and “conditionality” programs elicit
strong opposition from citizens of countries whose economies are already in recession
and producing far below their meager potentials —often resulting in anti-IMF riots.
But it would be wrong to assume that IMF economists are ignorant of standard macro
economic theory, or that the IMF is gratuitously sadistic. These IMF policies are
designed to increase the probability that the country will be able to repay its
international creditors, and makes perfect sense once one realizes this is their purpose.
If the government is in danger of defaulting on its sovereign international debt, forcing
it to turn budget deficits into surpluses provides funds for repaying its international
creditors. If the private sector is in danger of default, anything that reduces imports and
increases exports, or increases the inflow of new international investment will provide
foreign exchange needed for debt repayment. Deflationary fiscal and monetary policy
reduce aggregate demand and therefore inflation, which tends to increase exports and
decrease imports. By reducing aggregate demand deflationary fiscal and monetary
policy also reduces output, and therefore income, which further reduces imports. Ti g h t
monetary policy raises domestic interest rates which reduces the outflow of domestic
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financial investment and increases the inflow of new foreign financial investment,
providing more foreign exchange to pay off the international creditors whose loans are
coming due. Finally, since all in the country who owe foreign creditors receive their
income in local currency, anything that keeps the local currency from depreciating
further will allow debtors to buy more dollars with their local currency, which is what
they need to pay their international creditors.
IMF austerity programs are well designed to turn stricken economies into more eff e c t i v e
debt repayment machines as quickly as possible. There is little if any disagreement
among economists about what the short run effects of fiscal and monetary austerity will
be. Instead, we have a simple conflict of priorities: If the interests of international
creditors are given priority, the IMF programs make perfectly good sense. They are only
counterproductive if one cares about employment, output, capital accumulation, and
prospects for economic development in economies where the poorest four billion people
in the world live and suff e r.
Neoliberalism Aggravates Inequality
Challenging the myth that neoliberal policies promote growth is important because the
myth is wide spread — particularly among mainstream economists who seldom think
beyond the simplistic story line I outlined at the beginning of my talk — and also
because this is neoliberalism’s only claim to fame. But it is even more important to
elaborate on all the ways in which neoliberalism aggravates inequalities between and
within countries. These were not only the criticisms first voiced by opponents of
neoliberal globalization, they are, in truth, neoliberalism’s main story line.
Two of my colleagues at American University, Walter Park and David Brat, provided a
warning about rising inequality between countries in the early neoliberal years. T h e y
found that in a sample of 91 countries for which continuous data on gross domestic
product per capita existed the value of the Gini coefficient rose steadily from .442 in
1960 to .499 in 1988 — a 13% increase in the economic inequality between countries in
less than 20 years. The United Nations Human Development Report 2000 reported that
between 1975 and 1990 GDP per capita in countries with a high human development
index grew at a 2.1% average annual rate, while GDP per capita in countries with a low
human development index f e l l at a 1.0% average annual rate. The report also revealed
that between 1990 and 1998 the average annual rate of growth of GDP per capita was
more than twice as high in countries with a high human development index (1.7%) than
in countries with a low human development index (0.8%.) In short, the gap between rich
and poor countries has increased dramatically during the neoliberal era and continues to
do so. Moreover, inequality of income and wealth has increased within countries as well.
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In a major article, “Cross-National Comparisons of Earnings and Income Inequality, ”
published in the Journal of Economic Literature in June 1997, Gottschalk and Smeeding
concluded: “Not only did the US experience large increases in earnings and market
income inequality during the 1980s and early 1990s, most other OECD countries
experienced at least modest increases in inequality as well.” The evidence is so
overwhelming that none question that inequality between and within countries has
grown over the past twenty years. While supporters try to down play the connection,
neoliberal policies are one of the major culprits.
How Capital Liberalization Aggravates Inequality
Investors Capture the Lion’s Share of Efficiency Gains
Even when IFI and DFI do produce global efficiency gains they usually aggravate global
inequalities between countries. Global efficiency rises when international loans from
northern economies raise productivity more in southern economies than they would
have raised productivity domestically. But when capital is scarce globally, as it has
always been and will continue to be for the foreseeable future, competition among
southern borrowers drives interest rates on international loans up to the point where
lenders usually capture the greater part of the efficiency gain. Similarly, global
e fficiency rises when DFI by northern multinational companies raises productivity more
in southern economies than the investment would have raised productivity domestically.
But since capital is scarce globally, competition among southern countries for 
DFI drives down wage rates MNCs must pay, and increases profit rates of MNCs up to
the point where the MNCs capture the greater part of the efficiency gain. So even when
IFI and DFI work smoothly and eff i c i e n t l y, they usually increase income inequality
between countries. 
The Great Global Asset Swindle
Beside causing massive global efficiency losses and unforgivable human suffering for
hundreds of millions of third world residents, there is something else mainstream
economists won’t tell you about the effects of capital liberalization when they lead to
financial crises and IMF austerity programs as a “condition” for granting aff l i c t e d
countries a bailout loan. What I called the “Great Global Asset Swindle” when writing
about it in Z Magazine in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis works like this:
International investors lose confidence in a third world economy — dumping its
c u r r e n c y, bonds and stocks. At the insistence of the IMF, the central bank in the third
world country tightens the money supply to boost domestic interest rates to prevent
further capital outflows in an unsuccessful attempt to protect the currency. Even healthy
domestic companies can no longer obtain or afford loans so they join the ranks of
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bankrupted domestic businesses available for purchase. As a precondition for receiving
the IMF bailout the government abolishes remaining restrictions on foreign ownership
of corporations, banks, and land. With a depreciated local currency, and a long list of
bankrupt local businesses, the economy is ready for the acquisition experts from
Western multinational corporations and banks who come to the fire sale with a thick wad
of almighty dollars in their pockets.
But again, you don’t have to take my word for it. You don’t have to go back and read
the reports filed by Nicholas Kristof who covered Asian economic affairs for the N e w
York Times in 1998 and 1999 where he chronicled foreign asset acquisition in Asia in all
its gory details. You don’t have to listen to Chalmers Johnson, reknowned expert on
Asian economies, who argues there was a premeditated strategy to cripple and take over
Asian economies that were threatening US economic supremacy. Again, all you have to
do is listen to Paul Volker from the conservative establishment speaking in 1999:
What is happening in the banking sector is striking. Let me return to
Argentina…. Today there is only one privately owned bank of any size left in
Argentina that is not owned or substantially controlled by a large foreign bank.
We see the same phenomenon at work in Mexico: four out of the five largest
Mexican banks are owned by, or have substantial ownership interests, by
foreign banks. Mexico is a country that only a few years ago, you will recall,
took the position in the NAFTA negotiations that the one thing we want to
preserve is Mexican ownership of Mexican banks. That is an essential element
of our sovereignty, we must not give it up. Two of the largest banks in Korea,
which has had a nationally insulated banking system heretofore, are now in the
process of being bought by foreigners. Thailand’s financial system is being
penetrated by foreign ownership. Surprisingly enough even Japan, not exactly a
small emerging economy, in the midst of all this distress is apparently willing to
accept some foreign ownership of banks and certainly of other financial
institutions.
The Race to the Bottom Effect
The race to the bottom effect on labour standards, working conditions, and wages may
be unimportant to mainstream economic theorists, but it is real, and works with a
vengeance. Throughout the history of capitalism, since people have ties to places while
money does not, it has usually been easier for capital than labour to pick up and move
when it can’t get what it wants from its partner in production. Capital liberalization has
greatly increased this power imbalance, easing the way for companies not only to move
from one city or state to another within a country, but to relocate to any country in the
globe. Moreover, MNCs are playing the joke over and over again. Whereas workers in
OECD countries were victimized when MNCs relocated plants to countries like Mexico
and Indonesia in the 1980s, Mexico and Indonesia have become the victims of the race
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to the bottom effect now that mainland China has redefined where the bottom lies, and
MNCs feel safe behind “Communist” lines as long as the “Communists” agree to play
by W TO rules. Any who continue to harbor doubts about the race to the bottom eff e c t
should read about the cozy relationship between Walmart, arguably the most vicious cost
cutting company in the world, and the Chinese government, certainly one of the least
democratic and most repressive governments in the world, and how they have conspired
to achieve their goals at the expense of both American and Chinese workers. 
How Trade Liberalization Aggravates Inequality
Capital Rich Countries Capture the Lion’s Share of Efficiency Gains from Trade
The theory of comparative advantage has much to say about efficiency gains from trade,
and about the feasible range of terms of trade if we assume countries are free to operate
in their own self interests. But CA theory is conveniently silent on the subject of where
within the feasible range the actual terms of trade are likely to end up, and therefore
which countries will reap the lion’s share of the benefits from trade between them. Nor
does the other pillar of mainstream trade theory help us here. While Heckscher- O h l i n
theory may tell us who will benefit and who will lose from trade within countries, HO
theory is also silent about the distribution of benefits b e t w e e n c o u n t r i e s .
When there are efficiency gains to be had from specialization and trade there are always
terms of trade that would distribute more of the efficiency gains to poorer countries and
thereby reduce global inequality, while still benefiting wealthier countries as well. But
u n f o r t u n a t e l y, the international terms of trade generated by market forces u s u a l l y
distribute the lion’s share of any efficiency gains to countries that were better off in the
first place, and thereby aggravate global inequality. The most important reason they do
this is that as long as productive capital is scarce globally, that is, as long as having more
machines and equipment would allow someone, someplace in the global economy to
work more productively, there is every reason to believe the terms of trade will distribute
more of the efficiency gains from trade to capital-rich countries. Strangely, mainstream
trade theory contains no models that shed light on this important issue, so one has to turn
to models developed by political economists for enlightenment instead. John Roemer
developed a model that demonstrates this result in “Unequal Exchange, Labor
Migration, and International Capital Flows” published in Marxism, Central Planning
and the Soviet Economy, edited by P. Desai (MIT press, 1983). Appendix B in my book
Panic Rules! (South End Press, 1999) contains a simpler model that demonstrates the
same point. What these models have in common is they allow us to go beyond CA
t h e o r y, which merely establishes the range of feasible terms of trade, to determine where
in the feasible range the actual terms of trade will fall if terms are determined by
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competitive forces in international markets. What the models demonstrate is that as long
as capital is scarce globally, even when international markets for goods are assumed 
to be competitive, free market terms of trade give more of the efficiency gain from 
trade to capital rich countries than to capital poor countries, thereby aggravating 
global inequality. 
The intuition is straightforward: When northern countries specialize in producing capital
intensive goods in which they have a comparative advantage, and southern economies
specialize in labour intensive goods which is their comparative advantage, there should
be an efficiency gain. But as long as capital is scarce compared to labour globally, the
southern economies effectively compete among themselves for capital intensive goods,
turning the terms of trade against themselves and in favor of the northern countries. But
while the intuition is straightforward, the implications are profound: Even if
international markets are competitive, free market terms of trade will aggravate global
inequality in the normal course of events. 
Free Trade Aggravates Global Inequalities Within Countries
To understand why trade has aggravated inequalities inside MDCs we need go no farther
than Heckscher-Ohlin theory which teaches, as we saw, that returns to relatively
abundant factors in MDCs like capital and more educated labour will rise in MDCs,
while returns to relatively scarce factors like labour and less educated labour in
particular will fall as a result of trade liberalization. Of course this is exactly what has
occurred in the US, making the AFL-CIO a consistent critic of trade liberalization. In a
study published by the Istitute for International Economics in 1997, William Cline
estimated that 39% of the increase in wage inequality in the US over the previous twenty
years was due to increased trade.
H o w e v e r, Heckscher-Ohlin theory cannot explain rising inequality inside LDCs. As a
matter of fact, HO theory predicts just the reverse. Increased trade should increase
returns to labour, and less educated labour in particular, since those are relatively
abundant factors in most LDCs, while reducing the returns to capital and more educated
labour since those are relatively scarce factors in most LDCs. In other words, HO theory
predicts that increased trade should aggravate inequalities within advanced economies,
but should decrease inequalities within third world economies.
The problem is not with Heckscher and Ohlin’s logic — which like the logic of
comparative advantage theory is impeccable. The problem is that all theories implicitly
assume no changes in other dynamics the theory does not address. When the real world
does not cooperate with the theorist and remain ceteris paribus, but inconveniently
allows other dynamics to proceed, we often find the predictions of some particular
theory are not born out. That is not necessarily because the theory was flawed. It can
simply be because the effects the theory predicts are over-whelmed by the effects of
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some other dynamic the theory never pretended to take into account.
In this case I believe the dynamics in LDCs unaccounted for in HO theory are powerful
dynamics affecting third world agriculture. First, the so-called “Green Revolution”
made much of the rural labour force redundant in third world agriculture. T h e n
neoliberal globalization accelerated the replacement of small scale, peasant farming for
domestic production by large scale, export-oriented agriculture dominated by larg e
landholders, and increasingly by multinational agribusiness. To be sure third world
peasants make a miserable living on the land by first world standards. But they make a
better living than their cousins crowded around every major city in the third world from
Lima to Sao Paulo to Lagos to Cape Town to Bombay to Bangkok to Manila. While cash
incomes are meager in third world agriculture, they are better than joblessness and
beggary in third world cities. Three decades ago large amounts of land in the third world
had a sufficiently low value to permit billions of peasant households to live on it,
producing mostly for their own consumption, even though their productivity was quite
l o w. The green revolution, globalization, and export oriented agriculture have raised the
value of that land. Peasant squatters are no longer tolerated. Peasant renters are thrown
o ff by owners who want to use the land for more valuable export crops. Even peasants
who own their family plots fall easy prey to local economic and political elites who now
see a far more valuable use for the land and have become more aggressive land-grabbers
through a variety of legal and extralegal means. And finally, as third world governments
succumb to pressure from the IMF, World Bank, and W TO to relax restrictions on
foreign ownership of land, local land sharks are joined by multinational agribusiness
killer whales, adding to the human exodus. The combined effect of these forces has
driven literally billions of peasants out of rural areas into teeming, third world mega
cities in a very short period of time. This means there are many more ex-peasants
applying for new, labour intensive manufacturing jobs produced by trade liberalization
and international investment in third world countries than there are new jobs.
Even a casual glance at the scale of the human exodus from traditional agriculture
explains why unemployment is increasing, not decreasing, and wage rates are falling,
not rising, in underdeveloped economies. Political economists like David Barkin of
the Autonomous University of Mexico do not claim that trade liberalization has 
not created some new jobs in Mexican manufacturing — as Heckscher-Ohlin 
theory predicts. Instead Barkin and other Mexican economists point out that disastrous
changes in Mexican agriculture, induced in part by terms of the NAFTA a g r e e m e n t ,
negate any small beneficial HO effects on employment and wages that might have been
expected, and explain the large increases in u nemployment and the dramatic f a l l in real
wages that have occurred since the Mexican government signed the NAFTA treaty over
a decade ago.
How Neoliberal Globalization Hastens Environmental Destruction
It would take not only a separate talk, but a two course sequence to do justice to all the
ways neoliberal economic policies are hastening environmental destruction. But if by
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omission I left the impression that the Kuznets curve could save the planet, I would be
guilty of criminal negligence. So let me close my critique of neoliberal globalization
with two pieces of advice: (1) Forget the Kuznets curve, and (2) focus on m a t e r i a l
t h r o u g h p u t. As neoliberal policies hasten resource extraction and waste generation,
and as neoliberal policies lead LDCs to imitate MDC economic lifestyles, growth 
of what Ecological Economists teach us is the crucial variable - material throughput —
will destroy the biosphere long before the 5 billion people living in LDCs ever reach 
the upward part of the Kuznets curve - assuming there really is an upward part. 
While technical progress and education may be able to increase the value of what we
produce per unit of human effort without limit, increases in material throughput are
already causing great damage to the environment, and cannot increase beyond a certain
point. Unfortunately neoliberal policies raise the rate of material throughput more than
they increase the quality of our economic efforts. But that will have to be a story for
another day.
